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The Education of Consciousness: Virginia Woolf’s The Waves 
 
While Virginia Woolf’s The Waves has long been understood as a pioneering exploration of the 
experience of consciousness, it has generally escaped the analysis of philosophers, who have tended 
to explore her more explicit engagement with philosophy and philosophers, To the Lighthouse (Duran, 
2004), (Parkes, 1982), (Rosenbaum, 1983), (Luttrell, 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that The Waves 
has also escaped the attention of philosophers of education. With this article, I hope to reveal The 
Waves as an extraordinary exposition of the education of consciousness. The philosophy of education 
presented in the novel is descriptive rather than prescriptive, and I shall argue that Woolf explores 
what does happen rather than what should happen. However, despite Woolf’s (and my own) lack of 
prescription, her exposition of the education of consciousness can itself be a resource for educators, 
and her insight into the complex relation between dispositions, consciousness and the external world, 
allows her readers access to incidences of experience ordinarily hidden from them. To learn about the 
education of consciousness in The Waves might be to become better equipped for understanding our 
own education, and the task of teaching those for whom this education is also occurring. 
More traditional philosophers of education might find that where this article ends is where 
they would want it to begin. I describe The Waves and its characters, but stay inside the minds of the 
subjects. The description I offer is limited to educational reflections on what happens,1 avoiding 
normative or prescriptive questions and concerns. However, in my conclusion I hint towards ways in 
which philosophers of education who are interested in normative and prescriptive questions and 
concerns might approach this text in ways which I have not. The expressions I use in this paper – 
dispositions and consciousness – are gestural and figurative rather than exhaustive and scientific. I am 
not concerned with what these words mean in general but rather with what they might mean and 
might elucidate for educational thought in the context of reading The Waves. This article rejects the 
need to do something which undermines the literary space opened up by Woolf’s text by 
comprehensively elucidating key concepts (which are instead developed alongside my reading), saying 
why they are important (which I will take for granted, as Woolf seems to suggest one must), relating 
them to everyday life (what is more ‘everyday’ than relationality?), and defending claims like 
                                                          
1 Which follows a philosophical trajectory I began to develop in REFERENCE REMOVED FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF ANONYMITY. 
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‘dispositions are in-educable’ (which is a fundamental assumption made in Woolf’s text). The 
educational resonances of the text itself are my evidence, my context, and my point of interest.  
 The small number of philosophical approaches to the novel include Suzette A. Henke’s (1989) 
‘Virginia Woolf's The Waves: A phenomenological reading’ which applies a Heideggerian lens to the 
novel, an approach previously critiqued by Mark Hussey’s (1986) The Singing of the Real World: The 
Philosophy of Virginia Woolf’s Fiction, because of the lack of sensitivity it shows to the philosophy he 
sees as inherent to Virginia Woolf’s work. While more recently, Michael Lackey (2006) has turned his 
attention to critiquing not just the application of philosophers’ or theorists’ work to Woolf’s but also 
the implication that there was an inherent philosophy to it. In his ‘Modernist Anti-Philosophicalism 
and Virginia Woolf’s Critique of Philosophy’ he presents a strong case for Woolf as an anti-
philosophical thinker due to what he argues is ‘the philosophers’ blindness to the unconscious’ 
(Lackey: 2006, 93). In one of the only contemporary analyses of The Waves, Maureen Chun argues 
that ‘consciousness is radically depersonalized and physicalized in the novel’ (Chun: 2012, 55). While 
I agree that there is always an element of depersonalizing and physicalizing of consciousness in the 
novel, I contest that consciousness in fact becomes more personal and less physical within the first 
few pages of the novel and the progressively throughout. My argument is not laid out explicitly in 
terms of the unconscious but it does attempt to account for and respond to dispositions and 
experiences which exceed and effect on conscious or even simply intentional thought; that is to say, 
passively. These dispositions are the aspects of individuals which remain constant and might affect 
behaviours and responses to experiences in sometimes predictable ways. The Waves presents a world 
where these dispositions cannot be educated or even changed, however, because consciousness can 
be educated, it might be possible to enhance the best of our dispositions and repress the worst – or, 
of course, the opposite. Woolf’s novel shows what happens when consciousness is educated and 
illuminates conditions of existence that underpin educational experience. 
Through the different protagonists (who we will meet in the readings below), Woolf provides 
six examples of the different ways in which these conditions play out. The novel is divided into nine 
sections, the first three of which are dedicated, in chronological order, to the childhood, youth and 
young adulthood of its six protagonists. The novel’s complex narrative structure does not easily lend 
itself to brief synopsis as the six characters’ individual narratives move further apart from one another 
as the novel progresses. Maurice Blanchot even went to far as to say of the novel that, ‘plot is not only 
of no importance, it is imperceptible.’ (2014, 133). He makes this specific claim in the context of a 
broader argument on the paradoxes of the novel where he goes on to tell us that 
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novelists have no reason to think that a novel is good just because the plot is well handled or 
the heroes come from the normal world. On the contrary, a novelist must beware of the easy 
options provided by imitation, as well as the false resources of character analysis, psychology, 
or social history. It is within himself, in his inner dream, that he can best reach the mysterious 
reality whose revelation can only take place in the novel. (2014, 133) 
As such, instead of offering plot summary and character outlines, I will move on from my introduction 
to the basic structure of the novel, and simply gesture towards my close reading of the text, which is 
where I attempt to come into proximity with the novel’s revelation of Woolf’s ‘mysterious reality’. 
There is no single story, but rather six, sometimes interrelated, presentations of conscious thought.  
The first three sections of the novel are the focus of this essay as they provide its most useful examples 
of the education of consciousness. I will argue that these sections of The Waves illustrate how an 
individual’s dispositions underpin their education of consciousness and their conscious understanding 
of who they are. Even though each individual’s dispositions play a significant part in conditioning their 
education, they do not themselves seem educable or changeable. Dispositions, in the context of 
reading The Waves, are also not another name for an ‘essential self’ but rather one of many relations 
effecting on the conscious comprehension, agency, and passive receptivity of self that, for a few of 
the characters, is often in question. The structure of experience for these individuals is at the educative 
intersection of their dispositions, their consciousness and the external world. The experience of this 
intersection changes who they are, consciously but seemingly also unintentionally, as well as 
educating the very consciousness that enables them to conceive of themselves as a self. Crucially, this 
‘self’ is itself a site of mobile relationality, correspondent with Leo Bersani’s definition, whereby, 
‘Relationality is grounded in antagonism and misapprehension, which means that to meet the world 
is always to see the world as a place where I am not – or, if I am there, it is as alienated and/or 
unrecognizable being.’ (2010, 110). 
The reading I provide here might, then, offers less of an opportunity for educators, than an 
indication of a limit. The implicit claim might then be that there is only so much that can be done in 
formal, intentional education; especially given that the dynamics required for the education of 
consciousness reside within the relations produced between and within dispositions, consciousness 
and experience, often set at quite a (non-physical) ‘distance’ from more empirically verifiable external 
factors. Equally, these relations are not necessarily or always actively sought or controlled by the 
individual children or responsible adults, revealing a somewhat passive dimension to educational 
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experience.2  And, therefore, the significance of these forms of relation, and perhaps especially the 
relations produced by a broader conception of language, pose important questions for the educational 
subject in what we call the ‘information age’.3  
 
I 
The first section of the novel begins with descriptions of almost entirely passive experiences. There is 
very little content to the thoughts of the children that could not be described as bluntly empirical. 
They see (‘a ring…a slab of pale yellow…a globe’) and hear (‘a sound…something stamping’) but they 
do not act on what they see or hear (Woolf: 1931, 4). However, their perceptions quickly turn to 
analogies, allowing their empirical experiences to become a part of an abstracted consciousness: ‘’The 
leaves are gathered round the window like pointed ears,’ said Susan (Woolf: 1931, 4). An overlap 
between internal and external experience is already apparent. Memory allows the children to make 
these analogies and, as external experiences multiply in number, so do the resources of memory. The 
children all experience different things, so their memories are different and therefore the analogies 
they are able to make are, once again, different. For Woolf the complexity of individual consciousness 
seems to begin not with empirical experience but in the relation of memory to empirical experience 
through analogy. However, the disposition towards consciousness is not simply the sum of their 
memory and experience. Consciousness is itself something to be related to by their unique 
dispositions.  One of the children, Louis, shows what happens when his dispositions run contrary to 
the elicitation of a conscious determination of subjectivity: 
'Now they have all gone,' said Louis. 'I am alone. They have gone into the house for breakfast, 
and I am left standing by the wall among the flowers. It is very early, before lessons. Flower 
after flower is specked on the depths of green. The petals are harlequins. Stalks rise from the 
black hollows beneath. The flowers swim like fish made of light upon the dark, green waters. 
I hold a stalk in my hand. I am the stalk. My roots go down to the depths of the world, through 
earth dry with brick, and damp earth, through veins of lead and silver. I am all fibre… (Woolf: 
1931, 5). 
                                                          
2 A subject I have explored in detail in REFERENCE REMOVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ANNOYMNITY. 
 
3 Which I have written about the implications of in REFERENCE REMOVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
ANNOYMNITY. 
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When left alone he loses his identity to his surroundings. His self at once disintegrates and is extended 
to become his context: ‘I am the stalk.’ However, even this relatively radical experience of 
depersonalization is not without the resource of memory, here employed as imagination. The 
experience is one that Louis desires, preferring to be ‘all fibre’ over the company of the other children. 
He hears them calling for him but would prefer to ‘be unseen’ (Woolf: 1931, 6). It seems that his 
socially and consciously determined subjective self has disintegrated, leaving behind an asocial and 
experientially extended self: He is the stalk, he is not Louis. This experience is not the realisation of an 
existential self or a Heideggerian authentic moment but merely one among many examples of where 
dispositions and consciousness clearly reveal a subject that is inseparable from objects; or, to put it 
another way, where notions of insides and outsides become indistinct and arbitrary. Louis’s 
experience here is exemplary only in that it reveals the complex relations that - albeit in different ways 
- condition all consciousness. For Louis, this intense experience continues until he is found and kissed 
by Jinny and ‘all is shattered’ (Woolf: 1931, 6).  
 A few passages after Louis’s experience of being the stalk it becomes clear that the children 
are now in a school classroom. The reader does not know if minutes or years have passed. The 
children’s streams of consciousness continue to unfold at the unique intersections of their memory 
and empirical experience but at the same time it is made clear that their very disposition towards 
language differs from one another’s. Louis’s asociality remains, but now becomes bound up in his 
dispositions towards language, national identity and the social hierarchy: 'I will not conjugate the 
verb,' said Louis, 'until Bernard has said it. My father is a banker in Brisbane and I speak with an 
Australian accent. I will wait and copy Bernard. He is English’ (Woolf: 1931, 10). It is now apparent that 
his fixation on his difference from the others is informed both by his asociality and also by his conscious 
anxiety, which now starts the process of taking the place of his asocial disposition. But Louis is not the 
only one who is different. All of the children are also not so much shaped by a shared language as they 
shape it for themselves; or to be more precise, they colour it and move it: 
'Those are white words,' said Susan, 'like stones one picks up by the seashore.' 
'They flick their tails right and left as I speak them,' said Bernard. 'They wag their tails; they 
flick their tails; they move through the air in flocks, now this way, now that way, moving all 
together, now dividing, now coming together.' 
'Those are yellow words, those are fiery words,' said Jinny. 'I should like a fiery dress, a yellow 
dress, a fulvous dress to wear in the evening.' 
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'Each tense,' said Neville, 'means differently. There is an order in this world; there are 
distinctions, there are differences in this world, upon whose verge I step. For this is only a 
beginning' (Woolf: 1931, 10). 
Taken together these examples seem to reveal an underlying relation that each child has to their 
linguistic consciousness, as well as from their linguistic consciousness of the world. Louis, Susan, 
Bernard, Jinny and Neville all come to language differently. Language and linguistic consciousness are 
also empirical objects in The Waves. The Latin words the children are reading in class are perceived by 
a non-linguistic consciousness or self and they are themselves assisted by conscious analogy to 
linguistically anchored objects or experiences held in their memory and called upon by their 
imagination. The exception to this is Rhoda, for whom written language does not yet mean in the same 
way as language that is spoken or thought. Because she is unable to complete the exercises that the 
teacher has set, she is held back alone after class: 
The figures mean nothing now. Meaning has gone. The clock ticks. The two hands are convoys 
marching through a desert. The black bars on the clock face are green oases. The long hand 
has marched ahead to find water. The other, painfully stumbles among hot stones in the 
desert. It will die in the desert. (Woolf: 1931, 10-11) 
Rhoda’s imagination takes flight as the figures on the page continue to mean nothing. While for the 
other children the written words not only had meaning but unique meaning - differing according to 
their dispositions and memories – for Rhoda their non-meaning has meaning in and of itself. The 
difficulty that the reader is presented with is the decision as to whether or not Rhoda’s dispositions 
prohibit her from engaging with the written words or, instead, if she does not yet have the conscious 
capacity to understand them. Either way, the education of consciousness is key to both increasing the 
capacity for learning and understanding, as well as creating a conscious disposition which might 
counteract or take the place of the disposition.  
 
II 
In the second section of The Waves the passages recording individual consciousness grow longer and 
the language becomes more advanced. In this section it also becomes clear that Woolf has separated 
the sections into subsections set into separate periods of time. The beginning of the section is set at 
the children’s first arrival at secondary school, whereas it ends at the start of a summer holiday. The 
major change in terms of the consciousness of most of the protagonists is that conscious predicates 
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have more thoroughly begun to take the place of their dispositions. The clear disjunction between 
dispositions and linguistic consciousness apparent in the first section begins to disappear. This is either 
because linguistic consciousness is more fully able to articulate the dispositions than before or rather, 
as I argue, that its predicates have begun to co-opt those earlier dispositions. The more capable the 
children become at thinking in language the less likely they are to be influenced by those dispositions. 
Therefore, even if the initial disposition towards language is predicated by dispositions, the education 
of linguistic consciousness comes at the cost of pre-linguistic dispositions. Alongside the 
disappearance of these dispositions is the disappearance of the children’s passivity. Their thoughts 
are consistently directed towards active behaviour or opinionated reflection on experiences they are 
subjected to. What this section of The Waves begins more noticeably to illustrate is how language, or 
more specifically, linguistic consciousness, gets in the way of experience. To put it another way, as it 
develops, linguistic consciousness becomes an increasingly dominant aspect of experience for the 
children. Their dispositions are no longer mediated by their thoughts but rather repressed by them.  
 This experience of language and linguistic consciousness standing between dispositions and 
the world is articulated in different ways by all of the protagonists. Bernard’s opening monologue 
shows that this process, is for him at least, an active form of defence against the emotional experience 
the world around him provokes on his first day at school: ‘I must make phrases and phrases and so 
interpose something hard between myself and the stare of housemaids, the stare of clocks, staring 
faces, indifferent faces, or I shall cry’ (Woolf: 1931, 16). Language is not only the barrier that exists to 
stop his tears from flowing but a barrier between himself and the world. However, this barrier soon 
begins to become the most definitive aspect of his self. The same is true for Louis, who experiences 
the use of language as a means of conveying or creating perceptions of identity. He hears other boys 
boasting but feels that he cannot join in, ‘"My uncle is the best shot in England. My cousin is Master 
of Foxhounds." Boasting begins. And I cannot boast, for my father is a banker in Brisbane, and I speak 
with an Australian accent.' (Woolf: 1931, 16-17). In the first section of the novel Louis does not want 
to speak in class because of this same self-consciousness, and here its repetition is striking because it 
indicates a persistent conscious preoccupation with what he perceives as a hereditary inadequacy. His 
concern for the effect his accent will have on how he is perceived reveals additional tensions that can 
exist between self, language and world.  
For Neville, on the other hand, language is primarily something external to be learned and 
enjoyed. When he arrives at the school he sees the library, ‘where I shall explore the exactitude of the 
Latin language, and step firmly upon the well-laid sentences, and pronounce the explicit, the sonorous 
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hexameters of Virgil, of Lucretius; and chant with a passion that is never obscure or formless the loves 
of Catullus, reading from a big book, a quarto with margins’ (Woolf: 1931, 17). Language here is not 
the language of internal consciousness but rather of external experience, although as the first section 
of the novel made clear, these distinctions can be relatively arbitrary. What sets Neville apart from 
the other two boys is his apparent joy upon arrival at school and his perception of language as 
something to be enjoyed rather than to be used as a means of asking questions about oneself. Despite 
the fact that the language Neville is interested in engaging with is not his own, his relation to it exhibits 
his greater capacity to retain his dispositions. Language is not so much constitutive or representative 
of who he is but rather it is what he is predisposed towards. However, maintaining his dispositions at 
the cost of the development of a more conscious identity, with its concomitant predicates, means that 
even though he might know what he likes he does not necessarily know who he is. 
 For the girls, language is less an object of direct concern but rather a means of articulating the 
distance from their sense of self they have come to feel. Rhoda regards the ‘desks with wells for the 
ink. We shall write our exercises in ink here. But here I am nobody. I have no face. This great company, 
all dressed in brown serge, has robbed me of my identity. We are all callous, unfriended’ (Woolf: 1931, 
18).  And for Susan, ‘All here is false; all is meretricious’ (Woolf: 1931, 17). School has robbed them of 
their sense of identity and put them in a context of artificiality, the same kind of artificiality the 
experience of language exhibits more explicitly for the boys. The two girls’ dispositions make them 
feel entirely out of place and they are both forced to live this disjunction between disposition and 
experience. Only Jinny seems un-phased by school, concerned more with the colours of dresses she 
would like to wear and see worn (Woolf 1931, 17). Later she falls more fully into superficial concerns: 
'I hate the small looking-glass on the stairs,' said Jinny. 'It shows our heads only; it cuts off our heads. 
And my lips are too wide, and my eyes are too close together; I show my gums too much when I laugh’ 
(Woolf: 1931, 22). The language of physicality absorbs her linguistic consciousness as she embraces 
(however self-critically) that which Rhoda and Susan feel alienated by. In the first section of the novel, 
words make Jinny think of the kinds of dresses she would like to wear (Woolf: 1931, 10) but in this 
second section she has become entirely disconnected from the written word: ‘When I read, a purple 
rim runs round the black edge of the textbook. Yet I cannot follow any word through its changes. I 
cannot follow any thought from present to past’ (Woolf: 1931, 22). Words that are not directly to do 
with her sense of self and its attendant superficiality become unintelligible, seemingly through their 
lack of relevance to her primary concern: her appearance. 
III 
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The pattern or rhythm of the internal monologues changes once again in the third section. Bernard 
receives three monologues, interspersed with two from Neville, but Louis, Susan, Rhoda and Jinny 
follow in that order with only one each. Bernard’s opening sentence sets the introspective tone for 
this section, focusing on their young adulthood: ‘The complexity of things becomes more close,' said 
Bernard, 'here at college, where the stir and pressure of life are so extreme, where the excitement of 
mere living becomes daily more urgent. Every hour something new is unburied in the great bran pie. 
What am I? I ask. This? No, I am that’ (Woolf: 1931, 42). The mutability of identity is amplified for 
Bernard due to his constant reflection on it. Unlike in the previous section where Bernard simply 
analysed his use of language, here he uses language to address himself: 
you understand, you, my self, who always comes at a call (that would be a harrowing 
experience to call and for no one to come; that would make the midnight hollow, and explains 
the expression of old men in clubs--they have given up calling for a self who does not come), 
you understand that I am only superficially represented by what I was saying tonight (Woolf: 
1931, 42). 
It is not just that he does not know who he is, it is that he is conscious of several selves. Here there 
are at least two selves, one addressing the other. However, it is not clear if these statements are 
directed from the position of dispositions to a linguistic consciousness or rather the other way around. 
Either way, there is clearly a separation between the self as ‘superficially represented’ and actually 
experienced. Despite his confidence as to there being a self who comes at a call, ‘something remains 
floating, unattached’ (Woolf: 1931, 43). His identity remains un-unified, scattered, and his education 
has not helped him to develop his sense of self but has rather contributed to complicating it. A little 
later in this monologue (or should it be called a dialogue or internal dialectic?) he attempts to simplify 
these problems of consciousness by returning to empirical certitude: ‘When I say to myself, "Bernard", 
who comes? A faithful, sardonic man, disillusioned, but not embittered. A man of no particular age or 
calling. Myself, merely. It is he who now takes the poker and rattles the cinders so that they fall in 
showers through the grate’ (Woolf: 1931, 44-45). Only by absenting the complexity of his linguistic 
consciousness can he convince himself of his identity, which in itself would entirely invalidate the 
thought of dispositions or even a self, bound up in linguistic consciousness. The inability to bring his 
conscious and physical selves into alignment seems to have no obvious educational solution: there is 
nothing he can learn which will get him out of this predicament. And, in fact, the more he learns about 
himself and his experience the more complicated and unsolvable this problem becomes. 
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In a very different way Neville also expresses these problems of self-knowledge and the 
inability to learn who he is or who he should be: ‘I do not know myself sometimes, or how to measure 
and name and count out the grains that make me what I am’ (Woolf: 1931, 46). However, unlike 
Bernard, Neville is an eternal student of others, without ever seemingly finding his own voice in literary 
or existential terms. While Bernard is caught up in his multiple selves, Neville is defined by his relations 
to external others, whether they are his friends or writers of great books. On the occasion of a meeting 
with Bernard he ponders the effect of others on the self: 
Something now leaves me; something goes from me to meet that figure who is coming, and 
assures me that I know him before I see who it is. How curiously one is changed by the 
addition, even at a distance, of a friend. How useful an office one's friends perform when they 
recall us. Yet how painful to be recalled, to be mitigated, to have one's self adulterated, mixed 
up, become part of another. As he approaches I become not myself but Neville mixed with 
somebody--with whom?--with Bernard? Yes, it is Bernard, and it is to Bernard that I shall put 
the question, Who am I? (Woolf: 1931, 46). 
The way in which Neville perceives the affective consequences his friend has on his identity indicates 
that he does not think of his self as being essential but rather socially mutable. It is not just that his 
identity adapts to different settings but that it actually changes. This relation echoes that of Neville’s 
perception of language, in the second section, as something external to be enjoyed. This relation to 
language exhibits a singular disposition but comes at the cost of a conscious sense of self. When he 
engages with a friend he also partly becomes that friend or at least a self greatly affected by the 
presence of that friend. Asking Bernard the question of who he is not only implies that Bernard might 
know him better than he knows himself but also that he could potentially teach him who he is. 
However, even though Neville elevates Bernard to the position of a potential educator of his identity, 
he is also critical of the way in which Bernard seems to educate himself in his own. His internal 
monologue directs itself almost accusingly at Bernard and his modelling of his identity on Byron and a 
reading the poet as a mirror image of himself: 
You have been reading Byron. You have been marking the passages that seem to approve of 
your own character. I find marks against all those sentences which seem to express a sardonic 
yet passionate nature; a moth-like impetuosity dashing itself against hard glass. (Woolf: 1931, 
48) 
This realisation of his friend’s imaginative indulgence in exploring the Byronic aspects of his identity 
leads him to simplify his own understanding of himself. Neville no longer asks himself who he is but 
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insists, 'I am one person--myself. I do not impersonate Catullus, whom I adore’ (Woolf: 1931, 48). Even 
if Neville does not know who he is, he knows that his identity is singular rather than plural, or at least 
attempts to assert this fact to himself. Bernard, on the other hand, becomes more than comfortable 
with his plurality of selves. Although there is some ambiguity, it seems Neville has got frustrated with 
him and told him "You are not Byron; you are your self." To which Bernard’s internal response is: ‘To 
be contracted by another person into a single being--how strange’ (Woolf: 1931, 49).  When Neville 
leaves him, he feels his ‘familiars’ return and his plural self restored: 
The mocking, the observant spirits who, even in the crisis and stab of the moment, watched 
on my behalf now come flocking home again. With their addition, I am Bernard; I am Byron; I 
am this, that and the other. They darken the air and enrich me, as of old, with their antics, 
their comments, and cloud the fine simplicity of my moment of emotion. For I am more selves 
than Neville thinks. We are not simple as our friends would have us to meet their needs. 
(Woolf: 1931, 49) 
Bernard has learned to accept his disposition towards plural identity but it is a disposition which is not 
easily communicable. For Neville, Bernard’s Byronisms are a façade, whereas for Bernard himself they 
are a part of a constant and remuant experience of multiple selves. Bernard knows he is not Byron but 
he also knows that part of him is. Neville does not know who he is except in the company of others 
while Bernard cannot be himself in the company of others; his familiars go into hiding and his plurality 
becomes reduced to a superficial and misleading singularity. 
Louis’s experience of his own consciousness and comprehension of his identity is similar to 
Bernard’s in that he does not feel comfortable in the presence of others. However, for him this is 
because he is so self-conscious about certain aspects of his identity that his relations to others are 
internally disrupted. For Louis, ‘The streamers of my consciousness waver out and are perpetually torn 
and distressed by their disorder. I cannot therefore concentrate on my dinner’ (Woolf: 1931, 51). His 
disorder is not analogous to Bernard’s plurality, nor Neville’s reliance on his friends to provide him 
with his identity. Louis and Jinny are, for very different reasons, the two characters who are most clear 
about their identities. They do not ponder philosophically about who they are. Louis is entirely clear 
about the definition of his identity as the son of a banker in Brisbane, who has an Australian accent. 
But the affirmation of this identity constantly isolates and undermines him in the world around him. 
He feels as if his existence is counter to the rhythm of that shared by other people he comes across. 
While sitting in a café he becomes unsettled by his exclusion: 
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Here is the central rhythm; here the common mainspring. I watch it expand, contract; and 
then expand again. Yet I am not included. If I speak, imitating their accent, they prick their 
ears, waiting for me to speak again, in order that they may place me--if I come from Canada 
or Australia, I, who desire above all things to be taken to the arms with love, am alien, external. 
I, who would wish to feel close over me the protective waves of the ordinary, catch with the 
tail of my eye some far horizon; am aware of hats bobbing up and down in perpetual disorder. 
(Woolf: 1931, 52) 
He defines himself by his externality and therefore in opposition to the world around him. There is 
very little content to his conception of his own identity, as it is purely a structural relation to a world 
he cannot conceive of himself as being a part of. With every social experience he relearns his 
difference and reaffirms his arrhythmic existence. His formal education has not helped him here and 
neither has the informal education of his consciousness. However, his externality also gifts him with 
the extraordinary perception of the rhythm of the world, even if he is excluded from it. It is his sense 
of its rhythmic perfection that both terrifies and attracts him. The knowledge he has of the common 
is in this sense mis-educative in terms of his personal and social growth.  
Jinny is also defined by her perception of a kind of rhythm to the world, however, she feels 
very much included in it. The experience of the self-certainty of her inclusion is clarified by Woolf when 
Jinny attends a party in London: 
All is exact, prepared. My hair is swept in one curve. My lips are precisely red. I am ready now 
to join men and women on the stairs, my peers. I pass them, exposed to their gaze, as they 
are to mine. Like lightning we look but do not soften or show signs of recognition. Our bodies 
communicate. This is my calling. This is my world. (Woolf: 1931, 56) 
Her preoccupations are still with superficiality which simplifies her existence and allows her access to 
the world that Louis (and all the other, now, young adults) feel set back from in various ways. For Jinny 
there is no depth of character or critical self-reflection. She has learned the rhythm of the world but 
has not developed the complexity of her consciousness. This is not to say that her dispositions are not 
in play. In fact, her superficiality can be traced along a line from her early childhood experiences. She 
is the least conflicted and least complex character because her dispositions were always simple, 
physical and superficial. Her unquestioning approach to the world is not one that can be learned. On 
the other hand, Rhoda, who also attends the party Jinny is at, is harshly affected by its falsity: 
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What I say is perpetually contradicted. Each time the door opens I am interrupted. I am not 
yet twenty-one. I am to be broken. I am to be derided all my life. I am to be cast up and down 
among these men and women, with their twitching faces, with their lying tongues, like a cork 
on a rough sea. Like a ribbon of weed I am flung far every time the door opens. I am the foam 
that sweeps and fills the uttermost rims of the rocks with whiteness; I am also a girl, here in 
this room. (Woolf: 1931, 59) 
What Jinny embraces, Rhoda detests. But what Rhoda cannot understand is that Jinny did not make 
some originary choice to be superficial, it is rather a dispositional trait of her character, one which she 
has learned to accommodate and develop. Rhoda cannot be herself in this world and imagines herself 
as being at the mercy of it. In the same way that she was unable to grasp the meaning of the words 
given to her in the classroom in the first section and was left alone to deal with the problem, she is 
now alone in a crowd, unable to give or find meaning in society and, at the same time, is at the mercy 
of it. The analogies she draws between herself and the cork and the ribbon indicate the absence of 
control she conceives herself as being able to assert on the world around her as well as on her own 
identity and the paths she might wish to take.  
In this third section of the book we begin to see clearly, in all of the manifestations of 
consciousness the characters experience, what Leo Bersani describes when he tells us that: 
Our receptiveness to external stimuli is of course fraught with risk, most obviously in our 
political lives. Nothing is easier, or more disastrous, than to meet the anxiety-provoking 
demands of stimuli from the world by attaching them to representations meant to liberate us 
immediately from their demands. Demands that might expand or extend consciousness into 
new relations with other subjects among whom we live are projected back to their presumed 
sources as threats that must be fled. The refusal of the work all stimuli demand from us can 
take the form of an attack on an otherness that, we fear, would destroy us. (2015, 94). 
Woolf seems, in The Waves, to chart these demands, accessions, and refusals, within the realm of 
consciousness itself. We see, at once, how Jinny’s dispositionally grounded ability to respond to her 
‘calling’ allows her to sidestep the provocation of anxiety in a manner the other characters cannot. 
While Louis, in almost the exact reversal of Jinny’s position, defines himself structurally in opposition 
to, and against the world, as ‘alien…external’. Neville, Bernard and Rhoda, on the other hand, oscillate 
between these two positions; Neville in his plurality, Bernard with his Byronisms, Rhoda perhaps 
especially, conceiving herself as not of the world but at its mercy. What Woolf helps to illustrate, 
though, is that the conscious play of our receptivity and refusal is fundamentally produced in relation 
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to our dispositions, which seem, in The Waves at least, to be in-educable. Maybe, then, even as Woolf 
shows us how consciousness comes to be educated, she also repeats an older, more elemental, lesson:  
ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.4 
 
Conclusion 
The dispositions of the characters in Virginia Woolf’s The Waves guide, for better or worse, their 
relation to consciousness and the external world. Consciousness is itself shown to be somewhat 
external to these dispositions. The education of consciousness that each character undergoes either 
mediates these dispositions, takes their place, or exists in complex dialogue in relation to them.  The 
experience of formal education that each child is able to have is caught up in the personal and social 
anxieties that accompany the unique incidence of their dispositions, their linguistic consciousness and 
the external world. Their learning is conditioned by these unique co-incidences and, as such, they all 
come to language, education and the social differently. The characters who seem happiest are those 
who are best able to align their dispositions with their linguistic consciousness and external 
experience. However, there is no model offered for how this can be accomplished. Memory plays a 
significant part in their thought process but it too is subject to their dispositions. Memory in The Waves 
is a repository of objects to be drawn upon by consciousness, sometimes more or less under the 
influence of dispositions. From the perspective of educational philosophy, these first three sections of 
the novel are about two things: the part dispositions play in the education of consciousness and the 
in-educability of those dispositions. Because there is no narrator to tell the reader what the 
dispositions of the children are, they must be read in the negative through their streams of 
consciousness. As they grow older some of the children (Bernard and Jinny) learn consciously to 
communicate their dispositions to themselves but for most, because their very relation to linguistic 
consciousness and experience is conditioned by these dispositions, they become trapped in 
experiences which put their dispositions and consciousness at odds with one another.  
 The philosophy of education in The Waves is descriptive rather than prescriptive. That said, 
the description of the education of consciousness that the novel communicates presents several 
questions to educational thinking and practice. How is it possible for educators to discern the 
dispositions of learners? How do educators or learners determine if consciousness should be educated 
                                                          
4 ‘One’s bearing shapes one’s fate’, in Heraclitus (2001) Fragments. Translated by Brooks Hamilton. 
(London: Penguin). 
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as a means to better facilitate their dispositions or, rather, to take their place? And, if this is, in fact, 
determinable, what part can the educator play in this largely ‘internal’ activity? While it is not the 
place of this essay to answer these questions the examples of the education of consciousness 
presented by Woolf in The Waves provides important tools with which to explore them. By better 
understanding the ways in which the education of consciousness occurs from inside the minds of 
subjects, we might think about our differently about the education of our own consciousness, and 
educators might think more clearly about how they might respond from the outside. The primary 
‘educator’ in Woolf’s novel cannot be determined, as it exists in between the fields of dispositions, 
consciousness and experience. One certainty, though, is that intentional activities of external 
individuals (including those socially defined as educators) seem, in Woolf’s estimation, to have much 
less of an effect on the education of our consciousness than many educators or philosophers of 
education might assume.  
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